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Summary. Notwithstanding the recognized importance of traders’ expectations in
characterizing the observed market dynamics, for instance the formation of specu-
lative bubbles and crashes on ﬁnancial markets, little attention has been devoted so
far by economists to a rigorous study of expectation formation in the laboratory.
In this work we describe a laboratory experiment on the emergence and coor-
dination of expectations in a pure exchange framework. We largely base our study
on previous experiments on expectation formation in a controlled laboratory envi-
ronment by Cars Hommes, Joep Sonnemans, Ian Tuinstra and Henk van de Velden
(2002a).
We consider a simple two asset economy with a riskless bond and a risky stock.
Each market is composed of six experimental subjects who act as ﬁnancial advisors
of myopic risk-averse utility maximizing investors and are rewarded according to
how well their forecasts perform in the market. The participants are asked to pre-
dict not only the price of the risky asset at time t+1, as in Hommes et al. (2002a),
but also the conﬁdence interval of their prediction, knowing the past realizations of
the price until time t ¡ 1. The realized asset price is derived from a Walrasian mar-
ket equilibrium equation, unknown to the subjects, with feedback from individual
forecasts. Subjects’ earnings are proportional to the increase in their wealth level.
With respect to previous experiments that did not include an explicit evaluation of
risk by participants, we observe a higher price volatility, a decreased likelihood of
bubble dynamics and, in general, a higher heterogeneity of predictions.
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1 Introduction
It is by now largely acknowledged that investors’ expectations play a key
role in the formation of speculative bubbles and crashes on ﬁnancial mar-
kets. However, notwithstanding the recognized importance of trying to asses2 Giulio Bottazzi and Giovanna Devetag
the dynamics that govern the formation of expectations and their response
to information and experience, little attention has been devoted so far by
economists to a rigorous study of expectation formation in the laboratory.
There are several experimental studies on asset markets (see, among oth-
ers, [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. However, most of these studies’ main focus is the process
of trading and the way in which trading activity itself may push prices far
above or below the asset’s fundamental value, although in several cases infor-
mation about the participants’ expectations is collected as well (see [9] for a
review).
In this work we describe a simple laboratory experiment on the emergence
and coordination of expectations in a ﬁnancial market, in which no trading
takes place and in which subjects’ only task is to form predictions about
the future return of an asset and give a conﬁdence range of their prediction.
We largely base our study on a previous experiment of this type by [2] on
expectation formation in a controlled laboratory environment. In their exper-
iment, each market is composed of six experimental subjects who are asked
to predict the price of a risky asset at time t+1 knowing the past realizations
of the price until time t-1, the mean dividend at each period and the risk-
free interest rate. Subjects’ earnings are a function of their forecasting errors,
and the realized asset price is derived from an unknown market equilibrium
equation with feedback from individual forecasts. The authors ﬁnd out that
in most markets prices diverge signiﬁcantly from the (constant) fundamen-
tal value; moreover, speculative bubbles emerge endogenously due to positive
feedback expectations. In a related experiment ([3]), the authors introduce a
small fraction of artiﬁcial, fundamentalist traders. In this latter case, the mar-
ket dynamics show regular oscillations of the price around the fundamental
value, and excess volatility. In both experiments, subjects belonging to the
same market tend to coordinate on a common prediction strategy.
We replicate the experimental design in [2], but changing some important
features. First and most importantly, we ask our subjects to predict not only
the future price of the asset, but also the conﬁdence interval of their prediction,
which we use as an estimate of the forecasted variance of the returns. In this
way subjects are asked to provide an estimation of the risk associated with
their prediction and we are recreating a framework that is more similar to the
ones really faced by ﬁnancial advisors. We believe that adding information
about the forecasted variance in the model may aﬀect the dynamics observed
in the experimental market compared to the baseline case of [2, 3].
Secondly, in our experiments a subject’s earnings do not depend on his
forecasting errors, but are proportional to the increase in the wealth level of a
hypothetical investor (played by the computer program) who makes trading
decisions according to a mean-variance approach taking as inputs the sub-
jects’ forecasts and acting with the time horizon of one step. In other words,
experimental subjects act as ﬁnancial advisors of myopic risk-averse utility
maximizing investors and are rewarded according to how well their forecasts
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on the dynamics of subjects’ expectations, as in the original experiment by
Hommes et al; in fact, our subjects are not engaged in any trading, which
is done automatically by the computer program on the basis of the predic-
tions they provide; however, the payoﬀ assignment rule that we adopt is more
correspondent to what happens in real ﬁnancial markets, where prediction
accuracy only matters inasmuch as it leads to ‘correct’ trading decisions.
Finally, we inform subjects of the positive feedback mechanism governing
the dynamics of price. In particular, subjects know that the price at time t is
an increasing function of all market participants’ forecasted returns at time
t + 1, and a decreasing function of the forecasted variability of the predicted
returns. Subjects are also informed about the way in which the computer pro-
gram calculates their personal demand functions for shares on the basis of their
predictions, and on the nature of the asset pricing equation. In other words,
subjects know that the price level at each time step - and the correspond-
ing return - is generated by their own forecasting activity in a deterministic
way. With such additional information, there is the possibility for groups to
coordinate on a common expectation strategy. Section 2.1 and Section 3 re-
spectively describe our model of asset pricing and our experimental design
and implementation. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
As previously said, participants in our experiment are asked to act as ﬁnancial
advisors for mean-variance utility maximizer speculators with a short (one
time step) time horizon. We consider a simple economy with one risky stock
paying a constant dividend D at each trading round, and a riskless bond with a
constant return R. At each round of the experiment the participants are asked
to provide a prediction of the risky asset price return in the next round, i.e.,
of the relative price increase between the present and the next round, together
with a conﬁdence interval for their prediction. The participants’ predictions
are then used as inputs to drive the investment decisions of synthetic risk
averse traders, played by the computer, which ﬁnally determine the asset price
for that round. In this section we describe the behavior of the synthetic traders
in order to derive the explicit rules by which the participants’ predictions do
actually generate the price at every time step. We begin by describing the
traders’ demand functions following [1] and, afterwards, describe how the
individual demand functions are merged to obtain the asset pricing equation.
2.1 Personal demand function
Let W(t) be the trader wealth at the beginning of time t and let x be the
fraction of wealth he wants to invest in the risky asset. If the price of the asset
is p(t) and A(t) is the number of possessed shares then W(t)x = p(t)A(t).4 Giulio Bottazzi and Giovanna Devetag
The future trader wealth (i.e. its wealth at the beginning of the next round)
depends on the future return on the stock price h(t) = p(t + 1)=p(t) ¡ 1 and
reads
W(t + 1;h(t)) = xW(t)(h(t) ¡ R + D=p(t)) + W(t)(1 + R) (1)
where the dividends D are paid after the payment of the riskless interest R
at the end of round t.
We choose as the expression of the agent utility the simplest function of
the expected return and variance
U(t) = Et¡1[W(t + 1)] ¡
¯
2
Vt¡1[W(t + 1)] (2)
where Et¡1[:] and Vt¡1[:] stand respectively for the expected return and vari-
ance computed at the beginning of round t, i.e. with the information available
at time t ¡ 1, and where ¯ is the “risk-aversion” parameter.
Using the expression for W in (1) one obtains
Et¡1[W(t + 1)] = xW(t)(Et¡1[h(t)] ¡ R + D=p(t)) + W(t)(1 + R) (3)
and
Vt¡1[W(t + 1)] = x2 W(t)2 Vt¡1[h(t)] : (4)
Substituting (3) and (4) in (2) one obtains




whose maximum, remembering the deﬁnition of x provides the agent’s demand
of asset at times t, A(t) that reads
A(t) =
Et¡1[h(t)] ¡ R + D=p(t)
¯ Vt¡1[h(t)]p(t)
(6)
2.2 Aggregate demand and pricing equation
Consider a population of N heterogeneous traders. Let ¯i be (with i 2
f1;:::;Ng) the risk aversion of the i-th trader and Et¡1;i and Vt¡1;i respec-
tively his forecasted return and variance. If the total amount of risky asset is
Atot its price can be determined under the condition of reducing the excess
demand to zero. One has that the price p(t) must solve
N X
i=1
Et¡1;i ¡ R + D=p(t)
¯i Vt¡1;i p(t)
= Atot (7)
























is the analogously weighted expected dividend.
Note that (8) provide a positive price for the risky asset even if the average
expected excess return ¯ Et¡1 is negative. Note that the above pricing equation
has been obtained without considering any budget constraint for the agents.
The Atot can be reabsorbed in an overall rescaling of the parameters ¯i.
2.3 The skeleton of the experiment
We conducted experiments with a given number of subjects acting as advisors
for identical traders, in particular having an equal degree of risk aversion ¯.
The experiment structure can be roughly described as follows:
￿ each participant is asked to provide a range within which she predicts,
with a high degree of probability3, the future return will lay. Let ai;bi the
range provided by participant i 2 f1;:::;Ng.
￿ for each participant range we compute the mid value and take it as an
estimate of its forecasted return Ei = (bi +ai)=2. The forecasted variance
of player i is set to Vi = (bi ¡ ai)2=4, i.e. the provided range is put equal
to the 2¾ range of an (assumed) underlying normal distribution.
￿ (8) is used to ﬁx the present price p(t), then (6) is used to determine the
present market position of the synthetic trader, implied by the predictions
of i-th participant, Ai(t).
￿ once price at time t is determined, from the trader’s position in the previous
time step Ai(t¡1) and from the past price p(t¡1) it is possible to determine
the present value of her past position. The proﬁt earned by the prediction
of the i-th participant reads:
¼i(t) = Ai(t ¡ 1) (p(t) + D ¡ p(t ¡ 1)(1 + R)) (11)
Notice that the total number of assets and the synthetic traders’ degree
of risk aversion (as measured by the parameter ¯) can be used to tune the
3Roughly 95%, equivalent to the 2 standard deviation range of a normal distri-
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impact of the forecasted variance on the price of the asset. At the end of the
round t each participant receives information about: the new price p(t), the
new return h(t), and the realized proﬁt from the previous round ¼t. In the
next Section a detailed description of the experimental design is provided.
3 The experimental design and implementation
The experiment was entirely computerized and it took place in one of the
computer rooms of the Computable and Experimental Economics Lab of the
University of Trento on May 7, 2003. We conducted two sessions of the exper-
iment, with three cohorts of 6 subjects each participating in the ﬁrst session
and two cohorts of six participants in the second session, for a total of 30
subjects, who were recruited through ads posted at the various department
buildings.
Subjects were mostly undergraduate students in economics and had never
participated in experiments of this type before. Before the experiment be-
gan, subjects received paper copies of the instructions which were read aloud
by the experimenter to make sure that the rules of the market were common
knowledge among participants4. In addition, a handout with a summary of the
market functioning together with the speciﬁcation of the relevant parameters
was also given to every subject. All subjects could see each other but were pre-
vented from looking at each other’s computer screens by wooden separators.
They were told that they would participate in a ﬁnancial market composed of
six participants in which their task was to predict the expected price return of
a hypothetical asset and its range of variability for a total of 50 periods. Their
earnings would depend on the increase in the value of an initial endowment X
that they would have at the beginning of every period. Instructions explained
to subjects how their given forecasts of the expected price return at time t+1
Ei(t+1) and the conﬁdence interval Vi(t+1) would be utilized by the software
to compute their personal demand function in every round, and how the sum
of the personal demand functions of all six participants would determine the
market price of the asset in period t. It was explained to subjects that the
range V would be the interval of values that according to them would contain
the forecasted return with a probability roughly equal to 95%.
Finally, instructions also explained that their earnings at the end of each
period would consist of the capital gain achieved (which of course depended
on the realized price return), the dividends paid and the ﬁxed interest rate
R gained on the residual of their endowment. It was made clear that there
was no dependence between the investment choices made in diﬀerent rounds,
as a new, initial endowment X would be available to them at the beginning
of every period. In other words, subjects acted as ﬁnancial advisors of diﬀer-
ent investors, each of which acted as a mean-variance optimizer with a time
horizon of one step.





































Fig. 1. Price history for the 5 groups
Subjects were told that their demand of shares could be negative or zero
in some rounds, meaning that they could hold short positions or invest all
of their endowment in the acquisition of bonds that would yield the riskless
rate R. Their ﬁnal earnings would be determined by the sum of their earnings
in every round, and converted into cash as follows: the participant within
the group that had achieved the highest cumulative payoﬀ would receive an
amount of 25 ¿, while the participant with the minimum cumulative payoﬀ
would receive an amount of 5 ¿. All other would get a payoﬀ proportional to
the maximum achieved. Subjects were informed of the payoﬀ assignment rule
but did not have any information throughout the experiment about other
participants’ earnings, therefore such payoﬀ assignment rule gave them the
highest incentive to maximize their earnings. Finally, although subjects knew
that the market would be composed of six participants, they did not know
the identity of the other ﬁve participants.
Sessions lasted one hour and a half each. The initial endowment X was set
equal to 100 experimental schillings, the risk-less interest rate R was equal to
5%, the dividend was equal to 3 schillings. The parameters ¯ and Atot were

































































Fig. 2. Autocorrelogram of price returns for the 5 groups
4 Results
In Fig. 1 we report the observed asset prices p(t) for the 5 diﬀerent groups
together with the asset fundamental value ¯ p = 60. As can be seen from the
plots, price volatility is very high but, except for the ﬁnal rounds of groups 3
and 5, it oscillates around the fundamental value. Moreover, notice that the
price increase observed in group 3 and 5 is inconsistent with an idea of ratio-
nal bubble, since it does not display the expected exponential growth. Hence,
these can be plausibly interpreted as “speculative” bubbles. Their appearance
toward the end of the experiment is probably due to a more ‘extremist’ behav-
ior of some of the participants as the end of the experiment is approaching.
The behavior of the asset price in our experiment is remarkably diﬀerent
from the one observed in [2, 3], exhibiting a higher volatility and a substantial
lack of creation of relatively stable bubbles.
In Fig. 2 the autocorrelation structure of asset price returns r(t) =
p(t + 1)=p(t) ¡ 1 for the 5 groups is shown (bold line) together with the au-
tocorrelation of expected returns Et;i. The former is analogous in all groups
except group 5, showing a tendency toward anti-correlation at 1 time lag. As
far as the forecasted returns are concerned, one can notice that their autocor-
relation structure is rather heterogeneous, with, however, a general tendency
toward positive correlation, in contrast with the observed structure in price
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Fig. 3. Forecasted returns for the 5 groups. Each line corresponds to the forecast
of one agent
Table 1. Average and standard deviation of players forecasted returns computed
over 10 rounds
time group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 goup 5
10 4.061(15.688) 0.129(0.217) 0.326(1.336) 0.117(0.238) 0.510(1.100)
20 1.617(5.011) 0.173(0.402) 0.029(0.312) 0.157(0.275) 0.427(0.884)
30 2.812(10.972) 0.224(0.449) 0.224(0.490) 0.074(0.306) 0.827(1.239)
40 1.585(8.221) 0.189(0.511) 0.285(0.408) 0.132(0.425) 2.838(8.731)
The heterogeneity in the participants’ forecasts can be better judged from
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 that report the forecasted returns and forecasted variances
of all the participants. We have eliminated the very beginning and end of the
experiment in which some of the participants exhibit strange behaviors, prob-
ably due to lack of learning in the former case and end-of-experiment eﬀects
in the latter. As can be seen, not only predictions are quite heterogeneous,
but they do no display any tendency to converge.
In Table 1 and Table 2, we also report the average and standard devi-
ation values, calculated over successive 10 rounds of trading, of the agents’
forecasted returns and variances, respectively. As can be seen, the standard
deviation of both the predictors, reported in parenthesis, does not decrease
during the experiment in any of the 5 groups. The volatility level is group-
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Fig. 4. Forecasted variances for the 5 groups. Each line corresponds to the forecast
of one agent
Table 2. Average and standard deviation (inside parenthesis) of players forecasted
variances computed over 10 rounds
time group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 goup 5
10 0.012(0.008) 0.016(0.027) 0.016(0.014) 0.012(0.011) 0.029(0.031)
20 0.014(0.014) 0.033(0.052) 0.017(0.016) 0.012(0.010) 0.050(0.039)
30 0.014(0.009) 0.037(0.056) 0.019(0.016) 0.016(0.014) 0.069(0.056)
40 0.018(0.019) 0.038(0.061) 0.020(0.016) 0.021(0.028) 0.077(0.068)
to exhibit a higher persistence, in contrast to the forecasted returns. The more
risk averse participants can be clearly perceived in Fig. 4, and seem to behave
consistently over time.
Finally, in Fig. 5 we report the lagged cross correlation between the
agents’ forecasted returns and the realized price returns < rt;Et+¿;i > for
¿ 2 [¡3;:::;3]. In this way one can analyze both how participants take the
past returns into account when formulating their predictions, and how the
participants’ predictions themselves impact on the asset price. As expected,
there is a strong correlation at lag 0. A high prediction of tomorrow’s returns
formulated today generates a price increase and, consequently, a positive real-
ized return today. Interestingly, the correlation between today’s forecasts and
tomorrow’s prices is negative, suggesting a tendency to over-react to mar-
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Fig. 5. Cross-correlogram between agents forecasted returns and realized returns
autocorrelation in Fig. 2, i.e., of price “bouncing” dynamics. The correlation
structure between the participants’ predicted returns and past price returns is
extremely heterogeneous and only a low degree of persistence can be observed
in some cases.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have described a simple asset pricing experiment in which
participants must forecast both the expected future price return of an asset
and its variance. Our results show that, with respect to previous experiments
in which subjects had to predict only the future price value, - and the pric-
ing equation was linear with positive feedbacks from individual predictions
- we ﬁnd no evidence of coordination on common expectations, no evidence
of persistent speculative bubbles, and a high volatility in the realized price
around the asset’s fundamental value. In [3], the introduction of fundamental-
ist traders prevented the formation of speculative bubbles but did not prevent
traders’ coordination on a common prediction strategy. This coordination is
not observed in our experimental markets. We suggest that it is the nonlin-
ear structure of our pricing equation to determine such dynamics; in fact,
the inclusion of the forecasted variance determines a dynamic by which small
changes in the predicted conﬁdence range determine large ﬂuctuations in the12 Giulio Bottazzi and Giovanna Devetag
realized price, which in turn makes it very diﬃcult for subjects to coordinate
on a common strategy. Note that in our model we adopted the simplifying
assumption of an equal degree of risk aversion for our subjects. Future experi-
ments should aim at controlling for the - presumably - diﬀerent risk attitudes
of the participants in the experimental market, which are a relevant determi-
nant of predictions and expectations in this type of settings. Another possible
contribution would be to induce diﬀerent risk attitudes to the subjects and
test for its eﬀect on coordination. Taken together, our results conﬁrm the
importance of the market institutional details - and in particular the nature
of the expectations feedback structure - in determining the observed market
dynamics.
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The following is an English translation of the instructions given to subjects.
You are about to participate in an experiment on decisions in market settings. Your earnings will depend
on your decision and on other participants' decisions. If you make appropriate decisions, you will be able to earn
an appreciable sum of money that will be paid to you privately and in cash at the end of the experiment.
In this experiment you will participate in a financial market, and you will be asked to provide your estimates
about the price variation of a financial asset. The market will last for a total of 50 periods. Your earnings will
be based on the accuracy of your predictions in a way that will explained to you shortly.
All monetary quantities in the experiment will be expressed in experimental \schillings".
The Market
Each of you will participate in a market in which a hypothetical asset will be traded. Each market is composed of
six participants (hence, yourself and other five participants). The division between groups of six participants will
be made by the software randomly at the beginning of the experiment, and the group composition will remain
the same throughout the experiment. The only information that you will have about the market will be the price
of the asset over time, and its corresponding return (i.e., the price variation from one period to the next). This
financial asset is such that at the end of every period a fixed dividend of 3 schillings is paid for each share
owned (the dividends, for those of you who don't know it, represent the distribution of a firm's profits to the
shareholders). In this market you will only have to make predictions. The trading decisions will be made for you
by the computer program in the following way.Expectations structure in asset pricing experiments 13
Predictions
At the beginning of period t { hence having information only up to period t ¡ 1 { you will be asked to provide
two estimates:
1. your estimate of the asset's price variation in period t + 1, or, in other words, its return, which we call E.
This value can be positive or negative
2. Your confidence range for such estimate, i.e., the range in which, according to you, the actual return E
will fall with a probability roughly equal to 95%. We will label this confidence range with V
For example, you may predict that the asset return will be equal to 5%, with a confidence range of §1%.
This means that the most likely return for you will be 5%, and that such return may vary from a minimum of
4% to a maximum of 6% with a probability of roughly 95%.
The return is simply the price variation from round to round, defined as follows:
price(t + 1) ¡ price(t)
price(t)
£ 100
Clearly, if the price rises the return will be positive, whereas if the price falls, the corresponding return will
be negative.
Investment
At the beginning of each period you have an endowment of 100 schillings, given to you by a hypothetical bank,
and which you can invest entirely or in part in purchasing shares of the asset. The amount that you do not use
to buy shares remains in the bank and gives you a fixed (riskless) return of 5% in each period. On the basis of
your estimates of the return of the asset at time t + 1 and on the confidence range of your estimates (i.e., the
two values of E(t + 1) and V (t + 1)), the software will compute the number of shares that you purchase at the
beginning of period t according to the following equation:
D(t) =
E(t + 1) ¡ 0:05 + 3=p(t)
[V (t + 1)=2]2p(t)
(12)
where E(t + 1) and V (t + 1) are your forecasted return and its confidence range respectively, 0:05 is the riskless
rate of interest that the bank applies to you, 3 is the dividend paid by each share in each period. In other words,
D(t) is your individual demand of shares that the software calculates automatically for you in every period. The
higher your estimated return for the next period (E(t + 1)) the higher your demand for shares in this period.
On the contrary, the higher your confidence range (which reflects your degree of uncertainty about your own
prediction of the future return), the lower will be your demand for shares. Please note that the variable p(t),
which represents the price of the asset in period t, is an unknown in the equation, and it will be determined as
follows.
Equilibrium between demand and supply and determination of the
asset price




Ei(t + 1) ¡ 0:05 + 3=p(t)
[V (t + 1)i=2]2p(t)
= X ! p(t)
the term on the left-hand side of the equation is simply the sum of the individual demands of shares of all six
participants, while X is the total supply of shares, which remains fixed throughout the experiment. Since the
supply of shares is fixed, the higher the market demand for shares, the higher will be the price of the asset. The
market demand for shares will be higher in general the higher the expected returns and the lower the uncertainty
about such expectations (i.e., the lower the confidence range). After determining the price of the asset in period
t, the software will substitute its real value in eq. 12 in order to determine the number of shares that each of
you will buy.
Your Payoﬀ
We assume for simplicity that everything you buy at the beginning of a period is sold in the following period. Your
earnings will depend on how you have invested the endowment of 100 schillings that you have at the beginning
of each period, and may derive from three sources: the increment of value of the shares you own, the payment of
dividends at the end of each period, and the riskless interest that you earn on the remaining amount of money
that you have not invested in shares. The earning related to your prediction at the beginning of period t will be
realized at the end of period t + 1 and will be determined as follows:
¼(t + 1) = D(t)(p(t + 1) ¡ p(t)) + 3D(t) + 0:05 £ (100 ¡ D(t)p(t)) : (13)14 Giulio Bottazzi and Giovanna Devetag
The first term expresses your capital gain, i.e., the profit you earn by reselling at price(t+1) the shares that
you bought at price(t); the second term is the earning you get from payment of dividends (3 shillings for each
share), and the third term is the riskless interest gained on the residual. Note that you are allowed to borrow
money to buy shares or sell shares that you don't own in order to `buy' money. Hence, D(t) may be negative
in one period (in which case you will sell shares instead of buying them and will buy them back at the end of
the subsequent period; you will earn a capital gain if the price has decreased); or, the value of D(t) p(t) may
be higher than 100 schillings. In this case the last term of the equation will be negative, reflecting the interest
that you paid to the bank for the money that you borrowed beyond your endowment. Finally, if D(t) is zero in
a period, your earnings will be given simply by the 5% interest on your entire endowment. In brief, your payoff
will depend on the choices of investment that the software will make for you on the basis of your predictions.
Important: at the beginning of the next period, you again have a new endowment of 100 schillings. Everything
you bought is resold before a new period starts. Therefore, there is no dependence between your investment plans
in different periods.
A Numerical Example
At the beginning of period 4 - and knowing the asset price up to period 3 - you have to make a prediction on
the asset return (and its confidence range) in period 5. Let's us assume that you predict a return of 12% with
a confidence interval of §5%. The software computes the optimal quantity of shares that you buy in period 4,
as a function of price in period 4, which is still unknown. When all participants have entered their predictions,
the individual demand for shares will be summed up and put equal to the supply of shares, which is constant.
Solving the equation (demand=supply) will determine the asset price in period 4, which we assume to be equal
to 10:2. Now, the software substitutes the value of 10:2 to p(4) in your individual demand equation to find the
number of shares that you buy. Let's us assume this number is 5; therefore, in period 4 you buy shares for a total
value of 5 ¤ 10:2 = 51 schillings. At the end of period 5, you can see the earnings that you obtained with this
investment in period 4. Let's assume that the price at time 5 is 12:8, which is the price at which you will resell
the shares. The corresponding return hence is equal to (12:8 ¡ 10:2)=10:2 = 25%. Your earnings will be equal to:
G = 5 £ (12:8 ¡ 10:2) + (100 ¡ 51) £ 0; 05 = 13 + 2; 45 = 15; 45 :
Now let's assume instead that the asset price has decreased in period 5 to value of 2; the corresponding
return will be negative and equal to (2 ¡ 10:2)=10:2 = ¡80%. You had mistakenly predicted a positive return
and hence you had bought shares in period 4. Your earnings in this case are:
G = 5 £ [2 ¡ 10; 2] + [100 ¡ (51)] £ 0; 05 = ¡41 + 2; 45 = ¡38; 55 :
A wrong prediction not necessarily means the you will suffer a loss; however, generally, the more accurate
your prediction, the closer to optimal your investments will be, and higher your overall earnings. Your incentive
is to provide predictions as accurate as possible. The confidence range reflects your degree of uncertainty on your
own prediction; if you choose a wide confidence range, this implies you are very uncertain about the true value
of the return, and hence you will buy a lower number of shares compared to the case in which you indicate a
smaller confidence range. Your total earnings will be determined by the sum of the earnings you realize in each
of the 50 periods and will be converted in euros as follows: whoever among the six participants to the market
has achieved the highest earning will receive 25 ¿. The participant with the lowest earnings will receive 5 ¿. All
the other participants will receive a sum proportional to their payoff with respect to the maximum payoff. The
same rule will be applied in case you all suffer losses.
Information
The information that you will have in each period concerns the past realizations of the price, the actual return,
your predicted return, your payoff in each round with the indication of your cumulated payoff between paren-
theses. Besides, the values of the price and the corresponding return will be also displayed graphically (by two
continuous lines of different colors) in the box on the left handside of your computer screen. Recall that the
market will last for 50 periods. At the beginning of a period you will have to insert your values of E and V in the
two pop-up windows that you see in the bottom part of the screen by using the numerical keyboard and pressing
`enter'. The values you enter are already interpreted by the software as percentages, therefore you do not need
to use decimal values. You can choose values between ¡50; 000 and +50; 000 for the return and you can choose
values from 1 to 100 for the confidence range (you can simply insert a number for V; for example, if you enter 2,
the software will automatically interpret it as §2%. For the return, on the contrary, you also have to enter the
sign (+ or ¡).
Please, do the experiment in silence and do not try to look at other participants' screens. Are there any
questions?
Thank you for your collaboration!
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